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A Comparison of Pricing Structures at
Video  and Traditional Cattle Auctions
DeeVon  Bailey  and Monte  C. Peterson
The number of cattle sold through  video auctions  has increased dramatically during
the past  five years. In this study structural  differences in pricing between a group of
traditional auctions and the nation's largest  satellite video  cattle auction are
examined. A Chow test for structural pricing differences  reveals that the influence  of
lot characteristics,  market information,  and merchandising  strategies on cattle prices
are essentially  identical at both types of auctions.  However, optimal lot size is larger
at video  auctions than at traditional auctions.
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Satellite  video  cattle auctions  are rapidly be-
coming  a  popular  method  for  selling  cattle
(Scharlier).  For example,  Superior Livestock
Auction  (SLA),  the  nation's  largest  satellite
video cattle auction, sold more than 450,000
head of cattle in 1989  and over 760,000 head
in 1990.
Differences  between  traditional  and  video
auctions  raise  questions  about  methods  and
strategies  that  maximize  profits  in  this  new
type of market. For example, buyers examine
a video recording of cattle lots at a video auc-
tion rather  than viewing  the cattle  in person.
Also, the number of buyers is larger at video
auctions than at  traditional  auctions.1 In ad-
dition, video auction cattle are priced for future
delivery, delivery  weights are not guaranteed,
cattle  lots are  larger  than at  traditional  auc-
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tions, and buyers pay for transportation from
the seller's  location.  These differences  require
a unique approach to video auction cattle pric-
ing, and buyers and sellers should understand
the  relative  premiums  and  discounts  associ-
ated with cattle  quality,  market information,
and merchandising strategies between the two
types of auctions.
Several studies have compared relative pre-
miums and discounts at traditional cattle auc-
tions  for different  cattle  characteristics  (e.g.,
Schroeder et al.). Other studies have examined
the potential impact of electronic  market sys-
tems on structure and relative prices (Sporle-
der; Sporleder and Mahoney;  Ward; and oth-
ers). However, no one has compared the pricing
relationships between traditional and satellite
video cattle  auctions.
This analysis  compares  factors  influencing
prices  in  both types  of auctions.  This  com-
parison is accomplished  by conducting a test
for structural pricing differences between mar-
kets using pooled data for a set of traditional
auctions  and  the  SLA.  Sources  of structural
pricing  differences  between  traditional  and
video auctions are also identified. This infor-
mation will help buyers and sellers identify the
relative values of different pricing strategies at
traditional  and  video  auctions  and  will  also
help industry and researchers to better under-
stand the pricing methods at these two  types
of markets.
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Data and Procedure
Video Auction Description
Presentation of  cattle for sale at a video auction
includes two components-the video or visual
component and the  sales catalogue or written
component. Clarity and precision of these two
components are critical if cattle are to be rep-
resented adequately.  The quality of the visual
presentation of cattle sold at the video auction
is not examined  here. Instead,  the seller's  de-
scription and  terms listed in SLA's  sales cat-
alogues are evaluated to determine their influ-
ence on prices.
Sales catalogue descriptions prepared by the
video auction  company and the seller are de-
veloped when the cattle are videotaped (figure
1).  Videotapes  are edited to a length of about
two minutes and are shown in sequence  by lot
number during the video  sale. An auctioneer
solicits bids from buyers as the videotapes are
played. Buyers bid either in person or by tele-
phone if viewing via satellite  transmission  at
a remote location.
Buyers  register  with  SLA  before  each  sale
and receive a buyer's number after credit has
been established.  Anonymous bidding is em-
ployed  during the video  auction by using the
buyer's number.  Sellers  may  specify reserva-
tion prices if desired.
Model Specification and  Procedure
Several  studies  have  shown  that  short-run
feeder  cattle  prices  are a function of physical
cattle  characteristics  and  market  conditions
(Buccola;  Ernst  et  al.;  Schultz  and  Marsh;
Marsh;  Faminow  and Gum; Schroeder et al.;
and others). These studies examined the influ-
ence on price of characteristics  such as weight,
sex, number in the lot, breed, auction location,
lack of horns, lot uniformity, futures prices, and
other  lot and market  characteristics.  Several
of these studies used pooled data from two or
more markets  and reported that price  differ-
ences exist between markets (e.g., Schroeder et
al.).  However,  these  studies  did not  provide
information about the sources of price differ-
ences  as they relate to specific lot and market
characteristics and merchandising strategies at
the different markets.
Additional  merchandising  strategies,  be-
yond those typical in traditional auctions, need
to be considered  when modeling feeder  cattle
Figure 1.  Example  of video auction sales cat-
alogue  entry-1987
prices  at  video  auctions.  These  additional
strategies are related to sizing lots to fill trucks,
estimating  delivered  weight (and  subsequent
buyer discounts  for incorrect estimates of de-
livered weight),  and determining  optimal  de-
livery  dates.  Although  fundamental  market
measures  could  be used to model demand  in
these  markets (e.g.,  feeder and fed cattle  sup-
plies, production costs, feedlot capacity, etc.),
the  present  model  was  designed  to  examine
only short-run factors affecting  prices, reflect-
ing lot and market information publicly avail-
able to buyers. The model was also used to test
for structural differences between the video and
traditional  auctions.  A  hedonic  price  model
was selected for this analysis of a form similar
to that found in Schroeder et al.:
(1)
L  K
P, = a +  blLCi, +  ckMCi
1=1  k=l
+  ,  djMS,  + ej,
j=l
where P, is the price in the ith lot of cattle and
i = 1, 2,  3, ... ,  I and I is the number of lots
in the sample, LCi is the lth lot characteristic,
MCik is the kth market characteristic  (exoge-
nous shocks  to current or anticipated  supply
and demand  for  cattle),  and  MSj  is  the jth
merchandising  strategy.  The  merchandising
Lot #73
S&H Ranches,  Inc.
100  Heifers
Base  Weight:  410 lbs.
Location:  75 miles  south of Vernal, Utah
Description:  Out  of Angus and Hereford  base cows--
approximately  1/2  Hereford  and the
balance RWF, Red, Black, and  BWF, 20-
25% horns
Origin:  Duchesne County, Utah
Flesh:  Thin
Weight Range:  375-475  lbs.
Feed:  Dry  hay
Delivery Date:  22-30 January
Weighing Conditions:  Cattle  will be gathered  into  dry lot by 9:00
a.m.,  hauled 75 miles  to Vernal,  unloaded,
sorted  by sex, size,  and weight on  the
ground  with no pencil  shrink
Slide:  5 cents  per pound over  420 Ibs.
Comments:  Bangs vaccinated
Represented  by:  Jim Wingate
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Table 1.  Independent Variables of Data from the Video Auction Used to Estimate the Hedonic
Pricing Equation  (3)
Binary  Physical  Market Condition  General Lot Characteristic  Merchandising
Characteristic Variablesa  Variables  Variables  Variables
Breed:  Futures Price (Futures)
b Number of Head (Number)  WRISKd
English-Cross
English-Exotic Cross  Seasonality:  Average  Per Head Esti-  Uniform Lots (Uniform)
e
Exotic Cross  1st Quarter  mated Weight (Weight)  Lots Sorted by Sex
Angus  2nd Quarter*  Steersc  (Unmixed)
f
Dairy  3rd Quarter  Number Squared  Days to Delivery  (Date)
















Note: An asterisk  specifies the  control  category for  each  binary characteristic;  i.e.,  no  dummy variable  is included in the  regression
analysis for the category.
Categories  for each characteristic  are listed after the colon following the  characteristic.
bFutures price for futures contract  closest to but not preceding delivery.
cBinary variable where steers =  1; otherwise = 0.
dWRISK is the ratio of the acceptable weight limit minus estimated  delivery weight and slide specified by the seller.
eBinary variable  where uniform lots =  1; otherwise = 0.
Binary  variable where lots sorted by sex =  1; otherwise = 0.
strategies  considered  in  this  study  included
sorting by  sex and  weight  (uniformity),  esti-
mating delivery  weight,  and selecting  the de-
livery dates. The intercept is represented by a;
b,  c,  and d  are parameter  estimates;  and  e is
the error term. Table 1 details the lot and mar-
ket characteristics  and merchandising  strate-
gies used in this study.
Lot characteristics  affect cattle  prices since
they influence  the buyer's profit function and,
consequently,  the anticipated breakeven price
when the cattle are eventually resold (Buccola).
For example, large framed, thinly fleshed cattle
are  expected  to  gain  weight  at  a  faster  pace
than  fatter  and/or smaller  animals.  This re-
duces the per-pound cost of gain. Due  to ge-
netic compositions, different cattle breeds have
varying propensities for muscling, bone struc-
ture, fat, etc. For instance, Holstein and other
dairy breeds,  while  large  framed,  have com-
paratively  poor  marbling  qualities,  making
their carcasses less desirable as beef cuts. As a
result, lower prices are expected for dairy breeds
than for, say, English-Exotic crossbreeds.
The number of cattle in a particular lot and
their uniformity influence the price buyers are
willing to pay since search costs such as travel
costs,  salaries,  subscription  fees,  etc.,  are  re-
duced on a per-head basis for larger lots as are
post-sale  sorting costs  (Buccola;  Janssen  and
Shane;  Faminow  and  Gum).  For  example,
buyers  at  traditional  auctions  can  purchase
several lots at the same sale and pool them to
fill trucks. It is unlikely that video auction buy-
ers can effectively pool lots for shipment if the
lots are in different locations, suggesting buyers
would be willing to pay a premium  for large
lots at video auctions.
Lot  size  also  may  influence  pricing  struc-
tures at different auctions if different  types of
buyers with different cost structures (e.g., small
feedlots and large feedlots) are participating in
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the different  types of auctions.  For example,
large feedlot operators may be more willing to
pay  higher prices for large  lots of cattle  than
small feedlot operators simply because the costs
associated with handling,  sorting,  and feeding
large lots are different for the two types of buy-
ers.
Futures prices play a central role in price dis-
covery for cattle and other livestock (Hudson)
and,  as such, are used here as a proxy for cur-
rent  and  expected  cash  market  prices.  The
feeder  cattle  futures  contract  price  closest to
but not preceding  delivery of cattle  sold at a
video  auction  represents  current market  ex-
pectations for future cash prices corresponding
to when the cattle are actually delivered. Using
feeder  cattle  futures  contract  prices  corre-
sponding  to video  auction  delivery  dates  in
equation (1)  allows price spreads  between the
futures contracts  to explain price differentials
for different delivery dates. The nearby feeder
cattle futures contract price was used as a proxy
for  current cash  price  levels  (and,  therefore,
supply and demand conditions) for cattle sold
at the traditional  auctions and for cattle sold
at the video auction with deliveries before the
expiration of the nearby futures contract.
Lots sorted by sex (Unmixed) are expected
to receive a premium since post-sale sorting is
reduced.  Mixed  lots  sold  at  traditional  auc-
tions can be  easily  split and  sold as separate
lots by sex.  In a video auction, few mixed lots
are split between buyers.  Splitting video  auc-
tion  lots  would  be  inefficient,  especially  for
small lots not comprising  at  least one truck-
load.
Video auctions are somewhat risky for buy-
ers  since  average  delivered  weights  are  not
guaranteed. This is an important consideration
since  delivery  may  not  occur  for  several
months. Sellers deal with this problem by spec-
ifying an acceptable limit by which actual av-
erage  delivered weight may exceed  estimated
delivered  weight.  A  slide,  or  adjustment  to
price, specified  by the seller is initiated if av-
erage  weights  are  above  this  specified  limit.
For example,  a seller might sell calves with an
estimated average weight of 450 pounds (lbs.)
with a slide of 10C/cwt.  for each pound that
actual  average weight exceeds  470  lbs. If the
actual  average weight of the  calves  were  465
lbs.,  no adjustment to the bid price would be
made.  If the calves  averaged 480 lbs., $l/cwt.
(10 lbs.  x  10¢) would  be deducted  from the
buyer's original bid.
The acceptable weight limit and slide com-
bine to provide some protection for the buyer
and should be considered  together since  they
communicate the precision of  the seller's weight
estimate. A relative  measure of the total pro-
tection offered  by the weight  limit and  slide,
specified  as the weight risk (WRISK) and cal-
culated  as  the  quotient  of the  specified  ac-
ceptable  weight  limit and  the  slide,  was  in-
cluded as a merchandising strategy in equation
(1). In the example above,  WRISK would be
(470  - 450)/10  =  2.  The  expected  sign  of
WRISK  is  negative  since  increasing  the  ac-
ceptable weight limit relative to the slide should
decrease  the bid.  WRISK is  surmised  to  be
zero for the traditional auctions in this analysis
assuming that no slide is provided  the tradi-
tional auctions and that buyers can accurately
judge weights as cattle pass through the auction
ring.
Cattle are usually delivered immediately to
buyers at traditional  auctions.  Consequently,
the number of days to  delivery  (Date) is as-
sumed to be zero for traditional auctions. For
video auctions,  Date is  the  number  of days
elapsing between the date of the video sale and
the midpoint  of the  delivery  period  (e.g.,  10
October for the 8-12 October delivery period)
specified  in the video auction sales catalogue.
The expected sign of Date is unknown since it
is determined by price expectations for differ-
ent future  delivery dates.  Specifying a partic-
ular delivery  date  or period  may  be  an im-
portant strategy at video auctions if  price trends
can be identified and delivery dates established
earlier or later based on those trends.
Adjustment for Transaction Costs
Bailey,  Peterson,  and  Brorsen found that av-
erage  buyer  transaction  costs  (trucking  and
shrink) are not equal at video and traditional
auctions.  Since transaction costs  are expected
to  affect  bids  offered  by  buyers,  prices  were
adjusted  for relative  transaction  costs  before
conducting  the test for structural  differences.
These price adjustments  are  in the following
form:
(2) AP, = P,(1 - SA,)  + TC, + SB,,
where APi is the price for the ith lot of cattle
adjusted  for buyer  transaction  costs.  SA  ad-
justs  traditional  auction  prices  for the  "pre-
shrinking" that occurs as cattle are shipped to
the auction from the seller's location. For vid-
eo auctions, SA represents  "pencil  shrink"  or
a downward weight adjustment offered by sell-
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ers  to buyers at delivery  to make their cattle
equivalent  in  weight  to cattle  shipped  to  an
auction.2
TC and SB are the estimated trucking and
shrink costs, respectively, incurred by the buy-
er when the cattle are shipped in the case of a
video auction from the seller's location to the
buyer's or for the traditional auction from the
auction  to the buyer.
Trucking costs during the study period were
assumed  to  be  $2/cwt./loaded  mile  for  dis-
tances  less  than  150  miles  and  $1.85/cwt./
loaded mile for distances greater than 150 miles
(Webb).  Shrink  (SA  and  SB) was  calculated
using  Minish  and  Fox's  shrink  equation  (p.
161),  adjusted  for  excretory  shrink  regained
either  before  sale  in  the  case  of SA  or after
arrival at the buyer's location for SB (see Bai-
ley, Peterson,  and Brorsen).
Actual mileage  was used to calculate truck-
ing and shrink costs to adjust the price of cattle
sold at the video auction. Bailey, Peterson, and
Brorsen  found that cattle  sold at the  SLA in
1987 and located within the Dodge City mar-
ket area and buyers who purchased those cattle
were an average distance of 234 miles and 265
miles  from  Dodge  City,  respectively.  These
mileages were used to calculate SA (234 miles)
and SB (265 miles), respectively, for cattle sold
at the traditional auctions.3
Test for Structural  Differences
A  Chow  test was  used  to  test  for structural
differences between video and traditional auc-
tions (Chow).  This was done by pooling data
from video  and traditional auctions  and esti-
mating the parameters  of the following equa-
tion:
L
(3)  AP, = a +  bLCi,
/=1
K
+  ~  ckMCik +
k=l
M









+ ~  /kZMCk  +  ~  -YZMSij +  e,,
k=l  j=1
2 Pencil shrink is specified for each lot in SLA's sales catalogues.
3 Information was not available for distances cattle were shipped
to the Kansas auctions.
where  Z =  1 for video  auction lots and zero
otherwise (Kmenta,  p.  421); ID is a series of
binary (dummy) variables testing for different
intercept values  for price  between  years  and
between  the  video  and traditional  auctions;
andf,  X, A, and  y are parameter estimates. The
Chow test was  completed by testing the null
hypothesis:
Ho: Xi  = Aik=  'Yi  =  0,
for all  i,  1, k, and j.  The parameter  estimates
for equation (3) were estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS). An F-test was used to test
the null hypothesis that coefficients of the slope
dummies are simultaneously equal to zero, in
which  case the market  pricing  structures  are
identical. This test also allows an examination
of the sources of deviations between structure
at the two types of markets should differences
exist.
Reasons exist to expect the pricing structure
at video and traditional auctions to be differ-
ent.  Such  differences  are  expected  to  derive
from variations  in  how  cattle  are  merchan-
dised for sale and from other structural differ-
ences, such as the number and types of buyers
participating in each type of auction, but not
from the physical characteristics  of cattle.
Data
Kansas State University provided data for lots
of steers and heifers sold at four separate Kan-
sas auction locations  (i.e.,  Dodge City, Pratt,
Parsons, and Fort Scott) for sales held during
March  and  April  of 1987  (Schroeder  et  al.).
The data include quality information for each
lot (breed, frame size, flesh condition, etc.) and
prices received. The analysis excluded lots that
contained sick cattle  since these lots comprise
only a small portion of the volume sold at each
auction  and their  prices  are  not closely  cor-
related to general market information,  such as
futures prices.  Data gatherers  did not include
lots mixed by sex in the Kansas auction data.
Therefore, the price effect for mixed lots is not
observed for cattle  sold at the traditional auc-
tions.
SLA provided  sales catalogue  data and  ac-
cepted bid prices for cattle  sold from Kansas
and Nebraska  during  1987-89  (inclusive).  A
homogeneous feeder cattle population is found
in Kansas and Nebraska, and both states have
large and numerous feedlots [U.S. Department
of Agriculture  (USDA)  1990;  Sands]. Includ-
396  December 1991Pricing  at Video and Traditional  Cattle Auctions  397
ing only lots from Kansas  and Nebraska  also
allows for direct comparisons of pricing struc-
tures between  SLA  and the  Kansas auctions
since it minimizes the effects of transportation
costs, cattle reputation, and other regional dif-
ferences.
The analysis includes over 63,000 steers and
heifers  located  in Kansas and  Nebraska  sold
at the  SLA during  1987-89  and over 32,000
head  sold  at  the  traditional  auctions  during
March and April  1987  (table 2).  Larger  sized
lots are sold at the video auction, on average,
than at the traditional auctions  (table 2). Tra-
ditional auctions generally  sell cattle in small
lots  for  several  reasons  including  increased
uniformity,  serviceability  to  small  volume
sellers, and the inability to fit large lots in the
auction ring (USDA 1989). These practices are
reflected in the high degree  of uniformity  for
cattle  sold at the Kansas  auctions  relative to
the SLA (table  2).
Cattle sold at the SLA from Kansas and Ne-
braska were  shipped an average of 280 miles
for delivery  (table  2).  Over  76%  of the cattle
were shipped fewer than 400 miles, and almost
90% were shipped fewer than 500 miles (table
3). This implies local and regional buyers have
a competitive advantage when bidding for cat-
tle at  video  auctions because  their transpor-
tation costs are comparatively low.
Results
Physical Characteristics  and Market
Conditions
Table 4 presents the OLS parameter estimates
for equation (3) for the overall (pooled)  model
and separately  by sex  and weight.  The weight
categories depicted in table 4 are natural par-
titions  since most steers and heifers weighing
over 600 lbs. are placed in feedlots after pur-
chase  while most weighing under 600 lbs. are
placed on pasture or backgrounded before be-
ing placed in a feedlot (USDA  1990).
The  signs  of the  parameter  estimates  for
physical cattle characteristics and market con-
ditions are  essentially  the same as Schroeder
et al. This was expected since the Kansas auc-
tion data used  in this  study were a  subset of
the  Schroeder  et al.  data set.  The  parameter
estimates  for  Number,  Number Squared,
Weight, and  Weight Squared match  those re-
ported in Schroeder et al.  and  are consistent
Table 2.  Average  Characteristics for Kansas
Cattle Sold at Traditional and Video Auctions
Kansas  Kansas/
Traditional  Nebraska
Auctions  Video Lots
Average Weight  (lbs.)
Number of Lots
Average Number in Lot
(Head)
Total Sold (Head)
Miles Shipped for Delivery
Percentage over 900 lbs.
















































































with other past research  that determined that
prices increase at a decreasing rate  as lot size
increases  and decrease  at a decreasing rate as
weight  increases  (Faminow  and  Gum;  Buc-
cola).
The magnitudes of the coefficients for cattle
physical characteristics and market conditions
differ from Schroeder et al. since the data are
more aggregated here than in Schroeder et al.
and include data for only two months (March
and April of 1987). For example, Schroeder et
al. analyzed  10 breed and eight flesh condition
categories, while the same data are aggregated
into six breed and  four flesh  categories  here.
However,  the ordering of the parameter  esti-
Bailey and  PetersonTable 3.  Number  of  Kansas  and Nebraska  Cattle Shipped by  Various  Mileage  Categories,
SLA,  1987-89
Percentage  of
Number  Percentage  Number  Total Cattle  Cumulative
Mileage  Category  of Lots
a of Lots  of Head  Shipped  Percentage
100 miles or less  54  20.2  7,700  21.1  21.1
Between 100 and 200 miles  57  21.3  7,250  19.8  40.9
Between  200 and  300 miles  44  16.5  6,086  16.6  57.5
Between  300 and 400  miles  45  16.9  6,813  18.6  76.1
Between  400 and 500 miles  35  13.1  4,294  11.7  87.8
Between 500 and 750 miles  26  9.7  3,748  10.3  98.1
Over 750 miles  6  2.3  669  1.9  100.0
a Of the 427 Kansas and Nebraska lots sold,  160 lots were shipped to unknown destinations and are not included in these calculations.
mates for physical characteristics  is consistent
with  Schroeder  et  al.  across  sex  and  weight
categories.  For  example,  this  analysis  and
Schroeder  et al.  both determined  that higher
premiums  are  paid  for  large-framed  cattle
weighing under 600 lbs. than for large-framed
cattle weighing over 600 lbs.
Breed is an important determinant of price;
English Crosses and Exotic Crosses are priced
higher while dairy breeds and Exotic/English
Crosses are priced lower than Herefords.  An-
gus steers  and heifers  are priced basically the
same as Herefords. These findings correspond
closely  to past research  results  (e.g.,  Janssen
and  Shane;  Faminow and Gum;  Schroeder et
al.; and others).
Lighter-fleshed  cattle with large  frames  re-
ceive higher prices than heavy-fleshed  small-
framed cattle,  as expected,  based on the rela-
tive feedlot efficiency  of these types of cattle.
Lots containing cattle  with no horns,  or only
a few head  with horns,  receive higher  prices
than  lots  containing  mostly  horned  cattle.
These  findings  are  also  consistent  with past
research.
Merchandising  Strategies
Pricing and delivery are joint decisions at tra-
ditional auctions (i.e., cattle are priced and de-
livered the same  day).  However,  pricing and
delivery  strategies  can be  planned  separately
at video auctions. The results show sellers re-
ceive premiums for cattle  delivered in the fu-
ture (Date) (see table 4).  This finding implies
prices trended upward during the study period
and  suggests sellers  at video  auctions  can es-
tablish delivery dates based on price trends to
increase prices.
No significant difference in price was found
between lots sorted and unsorted by sex (Un-
mixed) at the video auction. This suggests that
price  is not reduced for unsorted cattle.  This
is somewhat surprising,  since  cattle mixed by
sex must normally be  sorted  after sale.  Only
about  1%  of the lots were  mixed by sex,  and
this result may not reflect  a true  market con-
dition since it is based on so few observations.
WRISK has a substantially negative impact
on overall prices  (table 4) but significantly af-
fects  prices  within  sex and  weight categories
only  for heifers  weighing  over  600 lbs.  This
result suggests WRISK is more effective in ex-
plaining  price  differentials  between  sex  and
weight categories than within these categories
and shows the relatively small range that exists
for  WRISK within given weight categories at
the SLA.4
Test for Structural  Differences
The Chow test implies  structural pricing  dif-
ferences  exist between  video  and traditional
auctions (table 4). However,  these differences
are minor and appear to be related to pricing
based on lot size (see parameter estimates  for
Number and Number Squared slope dummies
in table  4).5  This  does  not represent  a clear
4 While substantial uniformity exists for acceptable weight limits
and slides within weight categories,  differences exist between weight
categories.  For instance, in  1988 over 90% of lots with  estimated
per-head delivery weights under 600 lbs. had an acceptable weight
limit equal  to  10 lbs.  above the estimated delivery  weight while
approximately 70% of  lots with estimated per-head delivery weights
over 600 lbs. had acceptable weight limits that were 25  lbs. above
the  estimated  delivery  weight.  Since  1989,  SLA  has adopted  a
policy establishing all acceptable weight limits at  10  lbs. over the
estimated  average delivery weight (Branch).
5  A significant pricing difference also was found for large-framed
steers weighing  under  600 lbs.  However,  only  about  4% of the
observations  in this category had this particular  physical  charac-
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case for structural differences since the lot size
sample means at the video and traditional auc-
tions are different. A separate  examination of
the parameter  estimates of equation (3) using
only lots with fewer than 120 head (the largest
lot sold at the Kansas auctions was  116 head)
reveals that no structural pricing difference ex-
ists  between  the  auctions  for  Number and
Number Squared. This suggests that premiums
and discounts for lot size are the same at both
types of auctions but the shape (quadratic re-
lationship) of the price function relative to lot
size  is  different  because  the  lot  size  sample
ranges of the two populations differ.
Cattle  are  sold  in larger  sized  lots,  on  av-
erage, at video auctions than at traditional auc-
tions due  to the difficulty of pooling lots  for
shipment at video  auctions and  to more  effi-
ciently match supply with demand, especially
for feedlots (SLA 1988). Therefore, optimal lot
size is larger at video  auctions  than at tradi-
tional auctions.  For example,  the optimal lot
size for the Kansas  auctions for all weights is
between 50 and 55 head and is consistent with
past research results  (Schroeder  et al.;  Fami-
now and Gum). Optimum lot size for the video
auction  is  approximately  240  head.  Feedlot
operators prefer cattle lots large enough to fill
at least  one  pen  (typically between  100-250
head  depending  on the  cost structure  of the
feedlot)  (Reese; Miller Brothers, Inc.). Buying
lots large  enough  to fill  feedlot  pens isolates
health  problems  that could  occur  if lots  are
mixed. It also reduces the logistical problems
associated  with purchasing  cattle  numbers to
fit pen sizes (Stenquist;  Reese).
Because  lot  sizes  are  larger  and  weights
heavier at the SLA than at the Kansas auctions,
one would  expect more large  volume buyers
to participate at the SLA than at the traditional
auctions  (table  2).  A USDA  market reporter
estimates that over 75%  of steers and heifers
weighing over 600 lbs. sold at the Dodge City
auction go directly to feedlots after sale (USDA
1990).  Over 83% of the cattle located in Kan-
sas and Nebraska that were purchased at the
SLA  during  1987-89  went  directly  or  indi-
rectly  to  feedlots  (assuming that  most  cattle
purchased by order buyers are for feedlots) (ta-
ble  5).  Average  weights are  66  lbs.  lighter at
the Kansas auctions than at the SLA (table 2)
suggesting larger feedlot buyer participation at
teristic (large framed), and this result may be due to relatively few
observations or simply a problem in classification rather than an
actual structural pricing difference.
the SLA than at traditional auctions since feed-
lot operators  prefer  cattle weighing  over 600
lbs.,  ceteris paribus.
These results  suggest traditional  and video
auctions are competitive markets that offer ba-
sically  identical premiums  and  discounts  for
various physical cattle characteristics and react
in the same way to market information (e.g.,
Futures). Video  auctions  appear  to be  suited
to large transactions.  In terms of the types of
buyers participating, video  auctions are more
like private treaties (direct sales) than they are
traditional auctions. The high participation by
order buyers (table 5) indicates video auctions
are an efficient means to fill orders, and order
buyers  are  one  of the  major  participants  in
direct sale markets.
Beyond simply offering a new pricing alter-
native  for buyers  and sellers,  video  auctions
may improve overall market performance.  As
demonstrated  by Bailey,  Peterson,  and Bror-
sen, video auctions reduce combined buyer and
seller  transaction  costs.  Video  auctions  may
also eventually help regulate grades and stan-
dards for feeder cattle since video auctions sell
cattle from  numerous  regions,  and pressures
for normalization will exist. Beyond these con-
siderations (transaction costs and standardiza-
tion) video auctions offer a potentially impor-
tant source of price information for cattle not
only  in local  areas  but  also  in  regional  and
multiregional  areas.  Many  economists  have
viewed electronic marketing as the best meth-
od to increase  cattle market efficiency.  Video
auctions are the most successful form of elec-
tronic marketing yet devised.
Summary and Conclusions
The growth  in sales  volume  for  video  cattle
auctions during  the past  five years  has been
impressive.  Sellers  use  methods  and  strate-
gies  at  video  auctions  that are  substantially
different  from those  used  at traditional  auc-
tions including selling larger lots for future de-
livery, providing their own estimates of deliv-
ered  weight,  and  overturning  transportation
costs  to  buyers.  These  differences  require  a
unique approach to cattle pricing at video auc-
tions and require buyers and sellers to under-
stand  the  relative  premiums  and  discounts
associated  with  cattle  quality,  market  infor-
mation,  and  merchandising  strategies  at  the
different types of auctions.
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Table 4.  OLS Parameter Estimates for Equation (3) for Pooled Data from the Traditional and
Video  Auctions
Steers under  Heifers under  Steers 600 lbs.  Heifers 600 lbs.
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Table 4.  Continued
Steers under  Heifers under  Steers 600 lbs.  Heifers  600 lbs.
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Table 4.  Continued
Steers under  Heifers under  Steers 600 lbs.  Heifers 600 lbs.
Independent Variable  Overall  600 lbs.  600 lbs.  and over  and over
Number Squared  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.001  0.002
(11.419)**  (4.426)**  (4.979)**  (6.783)**  (6.708)**
Weight Squared  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000
(-1.652)  (-0.739)  (-0.011)  (-0.096)  (1.312)
Merchandising Strategies
Uniform  0.120  0.566  -1.902  -0.171  -0.103
(0.165)  (0.216)  (-0.953)  (-0.201)  (-0.073)
Adjusted R2 .787  .776  .711  .792  .767
Number of obs.  3,372  705  885  1,144  638
RMSE  4.001  4.990  4.289  2.756  3.154
Model F Value  277.783**  58.924**  55.432**  102.289**  53.441**
Chow Test for
Structural
Differences  25.6188**  3.3822**  2.8802**  9.3281**  6.0050**
Note: t-values are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistically different from zero at the 5%  level; double asterisks denote statistically
different from zero  at the 1%  level. N/A = not applicable.
a Binary variable equal to one for video auction lots and zero otherwise.
b Binary variable equal to one for lots sold in  1988 and zero otherwise.
c  Binary variable equal to one for lots sold in 1989 and zero  otherwise.
A test for structural pricing  differences  be-
tween  video  and traditional  auctions  is  pre-
sented here  using pooled  data for four  tradi-
tional cattle auctions in Kansas and the nation's
largest satellite video auction.  Premiums and
discounts for various  cattle quality character-
istics and reactions to market information are
fundamentally equal at the two different types
of markets. However, optimum lot size is larg-
er at video  auctions than  at traditional  auc-
tions  due  to the  inability  of buyers  to  pool
video auction  lots for shipment and the wish
to match lot size with that desired by feedlots.
Merchandising  strategies  play a key role in
cattle pricing at video  auctions, and more so-
phisticated strategies are required to maximize
prices at video than at traditional auctions. For
example,  establishing delivery  dates based on
price  trends  can  increase  prices.  An  educa-
tional  effort should be made through  the Co-
operative  Extension Service  to inform buyers
and sellers how to analyze  video auction mer-
chandising  methods  to  determine  optimum
strategies for this type of market.
Video  auctions  accommodate  large  trans-
actions  well,  unlike  traditional auctions  that
seem to be designed to facilitate relatively small
transactions. This suggests that future research
Table 5.  Percentage by Volume  of SLA Lots Located  in Kansas and Nebraska Purchased by
Separate Buyer Types,  1987-89
Year  Total
Buyer Type  1987  1988  1989  1987-89
............................................  Percentage of V  olum  e -----------------------------------------
Large  Feedlot (over  10,000 head capacity)  18.5  22.3  16.4  18.9
Order Buyers  41.5  56.0  46.4  48.2
Intermediate-Sized  Feedlot
(between 3,000 and 10,000  head capacity)  1.0  8.0  7.7  6.0
Farmer Feeders (less than 3,000  head capacity)  21.1  3.0  9.7  10.6
Wheat Farmers/Ranchers  7.2  3.2  8.1  6.3
Unknown  Buyer Type  10.7  7.5  11.7  10.0
Source: SLA (1990).
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regarding relative cattle pricing between video
and traditional markets should center on mar-
kets where relatively large transactions such as
direct sales are occurring. Since video auctions
appear to provide an efficient method for pric-
ing large and dispersed lots of cattle, it is likely
that the volume of cattle sold at video auctions
will continue to increase.  Video auctions also
may play an important role in improving over-
all cattle market efficiency  by reducing  trans-
action costs, providing additional  price infor-
mation,  and  possibly  acting  as a  catalyst  to
improve grades and standards for feeder cattle.
[Received October 1989; final revision
received June 1991.]
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